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People often view the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic
(CSFR), Hungary, and Poland jointly as being countries of the former
Eastern bloc most likely to achieve democratic political and market ec-
onomic reform. The recent constitutional developments of these three
countries do possess some similar traits - all three have striven to re-
instate the rule of law, create new democratic structures, protect fun-
damental rights and freedoms, create a system of reliable checks and
balances, and introduce a genuine judicial review. It is important to
realize, however, that despite these similarities, the current constitu-
tional debate in Czechoslovakia is fundamentally different from the de-
bate in the other countries.
The most fundamental difference is that Czechoslovakia is not ethni-
cally homogeneous, while both Hungary and Poland are more or less
ethnically homogeneous societies.2 In Poland, the Poles constitute ap-
proximately ninety-five percent; in Hungary, the Hungarians are ap-
1. Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1987, Comenius
University, Bratislava; LL.M. 1989, University of Michigan.
The author is an assistant to a group of American and West European scholars,
judges, and former government officials who advise on the preparation of a new Czech-
oslovakian constitution, under the co-chairmanship of Lloyd N. Cutler and Herman
Schwartz. The author wishes to thank the co-chairs, and Sophie H. Pirie and Milan
Lovisek for invaluable comments on earlier drafts.
This Article is adapted from a speech the author gave at the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 1992. At the time the
author gave the speech and wrote this article, many of the events that recently took
place were merely the author's predictions. Therefore, some of the items discussed are
given greater prominence than the current status quo merits.
2. One commentator defines a "homogeneous" entity as one (1) containing only one
people and (2) negligibly few members of that people live outside the entity. Elster,
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 447, 450
(1991) (discussing the commonalities and differences of the constitutional processes in
the countries of Eastern Europe). With regard to "heterogeneous" entities, the com-
mentator distinguishes between an "internally heterogeneous" entity that has large
number of members of several peoples, and an "externally heterogeneous" entity that
consists of one dominant people, a large number of which live outside the entity's bor-
ders. Id.
This Article uses the term "heterogeneous" in the sense of internal heterogeneity.
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proximately ninety-three percent of the population.3 Consequently, de-
bate concerning the future of Czechoslovakia and its constitutional
framework centers on "national ' 4 friction between the Czechs and the
Slovaks, at the expense of other issues that vitally need to be addressed.
The myopic focus of this debate casts into doubt the ability of the cur-
rent Czechoslovakian state to surmount the obstacles it must confront.
In Part I, this Article briefly outlines the history of the relationship
between the Czechs and the Slovaks, and points out some of the origins
of the current conflict. Part II focuses on post-1989 constitutional de-
velopments. It outlines the institutional framework of the present gov-
ernmental power and explains its crucial impact on the ongoing at-
tempts to draft a new constitution. Finally, the Article attempts to
explain the factors contributing to the failure to adopt a new constitu-
tion by the original deadline of June 1992, and outlines possible scena-
rios for the future.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Understanding the historical development of Czechoslovakia is a pre-
requisite for understanding the current constitutional debate. Peoples of
Central Europe characteristically pay much attention to historical
events; they carry a "backpack full of history" on their shoulders. In
Czechoslovakia, one still hears references not only to the Second World
3. Id.
4. The word "nation," as used in Czechoslovakia and other parts of Central and
Eastern Europe, exemplifies the semantic and conceptual problems of cross-cultural
exchanges. The term "nation" has a different meaning in Czech, Slovak, and German
languages than in English and French. The Anglosaxon and French traditions define
"nation" politically. The term "nation" means citizens of a state, members of a state
entity. See Bqmbik, Nibrod v eur6pskych siradniciach [Nation in European Axis], 51 /
52 Kultfirny Zivot 9 (1991) (analyzing the different conception of the terms "nation"
and self-determination in the Anglosaxon and French tradition vis-a-vis the Central
European understanding). In Central Europe, on the other hand, the understanding of
the term "nation" is based on the linguistic and culturo-historic characteristics. This
definition was conceived by the German Romantic philosopher J.G. Herder. Id. Ac-
cording to it, a community defined as a "nation" contains several attributes: common
history, customs, culture, territory, and language. Consequently, the Czechs and
Slovaks consider themselves distinct "nations."
English does not have a one word expression that would adequately convey the same
meaning as the term "nation" in the Central European linguistic and culturo-historic
environment. Id. The closest translation is probably the word "people." This term is
used, for example, by John Elster who defines people "as a community with common
traditions, common language, common religion, and - perhaps most important -
common enemies." Elster, supra note 2, at 450.
This Article will refer to the Czechs and Slovaks as two nations, and for purposes of
clarity will use quotation marks whenever the term "nation" contextually differs from
its normal English connotation.
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War, the pre-war years, and the revolution of 1848, but also to the
Empire of Samo, allegedly founded on the territory of the modem
CSFR in the year 623 A.D.
Compared to Samo's Empire, the coexistence of the Czech and
Slovak peoples is a fairly new circumstance, dating back to the year
1918. The Czechs and Slovaks, despite their similar ethnic and cultural
heritage, 5 experienced rather different histories.6 Before 1918, the
Slovaks belonged to the Hungarian Kingdom for almost a thousand
years. The Czechs, by contrast, governed an independent kingdom for
the first half of this millennium, before being annexed by the Austrian
Empire in 1627 for the next 300 years. In 1918, after the fall of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the first Czechoslovak Republic ("the First
5. Both Czechs and Slovaks descend from old Slavic tribes that settled roughly the
territory of modern Czechoslovakia in the sixth century A.D. In the ninth century, they
allegedly created an early feudal state, the Great Moravian Empire, which lasted only
a short time. Thereafter, eastern tribes, later conquered by the strongest among them,
the Magyars, penetrated the Danube lowland and separated the Slovak tribes from the
Czech tribes for a thousand years. The historical paths of Czechs and Slovaks crossed
several times during the subsequent thousand years. Since the 16th century they both
lived under the Habsburg monarchs. Each "nation," however, remained so separate
and distinct that the creation and development of national consciousness and self-
awareness during the eighteenth ani nineteenth centuries differed considerably among
each "nation." See Podiven, Nirod CeskoslovenskP [Czechoslovak Nation], 17 Revue
pro St~edni Evropu 82 (1990) (explaining the history of thS Czechs qnd the Slovaks
and the history of their relationship); Kov.c, Slovaci a Cesi: Pohlad v spanom
zrkadle [Slovaks and Czechs: Look into a Rearview Mirror], 5 Kult6rny Zivot I
(1992)(explaining the differences in understanding the concept of a common state be-
tween the Slovaks and the Czechs). See also, Cutler & Schwartz, Constitutional Re-
form in Czechoslovakia: E duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 511 (1991)(discussing
the approach of the newly renamed Czech and Slovak Federative Republic to each of
four major constitutional issues: federalism; the bill of rights; an independent judiciary;
and the separation of powers among the President, the cabinet, and the federal
legislature).
6. Rather few "commonalities" exist in the cultural profiles of Czechs and Slovaks.
Consistent with tradition, Slovakia's cultural heritage revolved around Roman Catholic
religion and rural living conditions prior to the communist post-war industrialization.
The Czech Republic has a mixture of Roman Catholic and Protestant religions. On the
whole, however, a lot of Czechs are secular and "religiously luke-warm" with a long
tradition of town culture, and a comparatively strong industrial base. See Petr, Ces-
ko(-)Slovensko nen! samozrejmosti [Czech(-)Slovakia is not givenj, 42 Respekt 4
(1991)(describing some of the differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks at the
time the First Republic came into being); Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 664 (1991) (discussing how cultural integrity and self-deter-
mination frequently fuel secession movements in Eastern Etkrope and elsewhere);
Prihoda, Ceske Dilema: Slovai [Czech Dilemma: Slovaks]. C10/91 Prtomnost 1
(1991) (discussing the various differences between the two "nations" and suggesting
that a gradual and negotiated disintegration of the country may be the only way to
settle the Czech-Slovak conflict).
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Republic")," the home for both Czechs and Slovaks, came into being.
The Treaty of Versailles confirmed its creation in 1919.
The First Republic was a relatively well-functioning democracy.8 Its
basic document, the Declaration of Independence, promulgated by the
Czechoslovak National Council in Paris in 1918,9 spelled out the prin-
ciples of Czechoslovakian constitutionalism: parliamentarianism; gov-
ernmental legitimacy based on a broad national consensus; proportional
representation; and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, in-
cluding the rights of national minorities.' 0 The first Czechoslovakian
constitution of February 29, 1920, incorporated these principles.
Despite the largely positive democratic characteristics of the First
Republic, the Slovaks felt that they had merely traded Hungarian
domination for Czech domination. They lacked an administrative and
political expression of self-governance. During World War I, future
Czechoslovakian President Tomd's Masaryk first agreed with Slovak
representatives in the United States," in the "Cleveland Agreement"
of 1916,12 that the future Czechoslovakia would be a federation. Later,
the Slovaks obtained a further confirmation of their goal of autonomy
in the "Pittsburg Agreement."' 3 This May 1918 agreement between
Masaryk and the American Slovaks, without explicitly referring to a
federation, formulated institutional safeguards of Slovak self-govern-
ance: a Slovak administration, assembly, and courts.'4 The interpreta-
tion of the "Pittsburg Agreement" and its validity has not been consis-
tent.'5 By the end of the war, the founding fathers opposed having a
federation comprised of two separate sovereign republics, and as a re-
7. The Czechoslovak Republic was one of a number of small, culturally, religiously,
and ethnically diverse states that came into being after the fall of the Habsburg, Otto-
man, and Czarist empires in 1917-1921.
8. See Cutler and Schwartz, supra note 5, at 513 (discussing how, in their first
constitution, the Czechs and Slovaks looked to the West for inspiration and example, in
particular to the French parliamentary, and the American systems).
9. Tomdvs Garrique Masaryk, the founder of Czechoslovakia and its first president,
headed this body.
10. See generally, Grospic & Matula, K Demokratick Tradici Ceskoslovenskbho
Konstitucionalismu [On the Demqcratic Tradition of Czechoslovak Constitutional-
ism], 130 PRAVNfK, TEORETICK"I CASOPIS PRO OTAZKY STATU A PRAVA [THE LAW-
YER SCIENTIFIC REVIEW FOR PROBLEMS OF STATE AND LAW] 608, 611 (1991)(detail-
ing Czechoslovakia's constitutional history and democratic tradition).
11. At the beginning of the century, a fairly well organized Slovak community,
formed by Slovaks that emigraed for economic reasons, existed in the United States.
12. See generally Dolezel, Cesko ? Slovensko, Prostor slovenske politiky [Czecho
? Slovakia, The Space of Slovak Politics], Pvriloha Lidov ,ch Novin, Oct. 15, 1991, at
I-IV.
13. Id.
14. Id. See also Respekt, supra note 4, at 4.
15. Dolezel, supra note 12, at I-IV.
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suit, the First Republic became a unitary state. The idea of a federa-
tion currently dominates the drafting of the new constitution.' 6 The of-
ficial ideology of the First Republic was the existence of a single
"Czechoslovak nation" bound by one government and cemented by one
language."7 The Slovaks never accepted this concept, and it remains the
aspect of President Masaryk's political views most criticized by
Slovaks."8
The Slovak feelings of oppression and resentment caused by the lack
of self-governance and self-determination continued throughout the ex-
istence of the First Republic. The unfulfilled promise of a federal struc-
ture or autonomy just aggravated these feelings. These ultimately led
to the creation of a putatively "independent" Slovak Republic in
1939.19 In reality, this republic was merely a puppet of Hitler's Ger-
many, a stigma against which Slovak nationalism today still strug-
gles.20 The republic, however, gained enough momentum to cause the
post-war transitional democratic government to adopt a plan in 1945,
the so-called Kovice governmental program, which granted Slovaks
some degree of self-determination within Czechoslovakia. It created a
unitary state with a special position for Slovak bodies and their exclu-
sive jurisdiction in certain areas.2 Unfortunately, when the communists
seized power in February 1948, Czechoslovakia's democratic existence
was terminated for over forty years, but not Slovakia's hopes for
greater autonomy.
16. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 514.
17. See Podiven, supra note 5, at 82 (noting that some declare the Slovak language
a dialect of the Czech language, while others consider them "two branches of the same
tree"); Dolevel, supra note 12, at I-IV.
18. Podiven, supra note 3, at 82; Kov.dc, supra note 3. at 1. Rather than trying to
identify every reason why the Slovaks appeal for greater autonomy and sovereignty,
this article focusses on the effect of these appeals on the constitutional processes in
Czechoslovakia today.
19. The Slovak Republic came into existence by a declaration of the Slovak Snem
(assembly) on March 14, 1939, several months after the Munich dictate and the Vien-
nese "arbitrage," pursuant to which Czechoslovakia lost its western territory, the
Sudetenland, and southern Slovakia to Germany and Hungary, respectively. In Novem-
ber, 1938, the Slovak Snem passed the law No. 299 declaring the autonomy of
Slovakia. The Slovak declaration of autonomy, and later the proclamation of an inde-
pendent Slovak state, were unconstitutional acts under the Constitution of 1920, which
did not allow territorial division of Czechoslovakia. Jin Mlyndlrik, Pro Presnost.
Vyhlisen(Slovenskho Stbtu byl Prot(stavn( Cin [For Accuracy. Proclamation of the
Slovak State was an Unconstitutional Acti, Respekt, Sept. 9 - Oct. 6, 1991, at 6. See
also Dolezel, supra note 12, at I-IV.
20. ,See spanbr, Slovensko: ide o dusu /Slovakia: the Soul is at Stakel, 7 Kul-
tfirny Zivot 1 (1992) (discussing the necessity of the Slovak nation coming to terms
with its fascist period during World War Two).
21. See Dolevel, supra note 12, at I-IV. The plan was named after a city in Eastern
Slovakia, Kovsice, where it was executed.
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The Constitution of May 9, 1948, retreated from the idea of a single
Czechoslovak nation. In its preamble, the constitution defined Czecho-
slovakia as a state comprised of "two equal Slavic nations, Czechs and
Slovaks."22 It also provided for a Slovak National Council and a Com-
mittee of Delegates (Zbor Poverenikov) in Slovakia.23 These bodies did
not have equivalents in the Czech lands, and presumably were partial
compensation for having the center of power and the capital located in
Czech Prague. This unusual asymmetry even survived the new constitu-
tion of July 11, 1960,24 which broadened the power of the Slovak Na-
tional Council.
Slovak yearnings for substantiation of their "national" identity came
to the forefront of constitutional policies again in the aftermath of the
1968 Prague Spring. The Law on Czechoslovak Federation, adopted
after the Soviet occupation in 1968 as an amendment to the 1960 Con-
stitution,25 established a federal structure with a bicameral parliament
in a country with twice as many people living in the Czech lands than
in Slovakia. However, it failed to resolve the real issue - Slovak self-
governance. Also importantly, the absolute rule of the Communist
Party's central committee effectively thwarted the implementation of
the 1968 Federation amendment.2 In other words, the federal struc-
ture set up by the 1968 amendment was never tested in practice, be-
cause the bicameral Federal Assembly was reduced to a rubber-stamp-
ing organ. As Vdclav Havel, before 1989 a prominent dissident and
now the President of Czechoslovakia, said referring to 1968, history
stopped and the country was put to sleep for twenty years.
22. Vratislav Pechota, Ceskoslovensk6 ustavni Dejiny, 130 PRAVNIK, TEORETICKI
CASOPIS PRO OTAZKY STATU A PRAVA [THE LAWYER SCIENTIFIC REVIEW FOR
PROBLEMS OF STATE AND LAW] 273 (1991).
23. Dolevel, supra note 12, at I-IV.
24. UST.ZAK. c.100/1960 Zb., Czech. Const. of 1960 reprinted in GISBERT H.
FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Blau-
stein & Flanz, eds. 1974).
25. UST.ZAK. c.143/1968 Zb. o ceskoslovenskej federfcii, (CZECH. CONST. ACT
No. 143/1968 Collection of Laws [hereinafter "Coll. of Laws"], Concerning the
Czechoslovak Federation) [hereinafter "1968 Federation amendment"], reprinted in
GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CZECHOSLO-
VAKIA, (Blaustein & Flanz, eds, 1974).
26. "The administrative directive implementation of the leading role of the Com-
munist Party of Czechoslovakia distorted the entire political system, including the fed-
qral structure .... Ale's Gerloch, Nad Variantami Novho Sttoprhvniho Uspovrdbni
Ceskoslovenskbho Stbtu [On the Alternatives of Constitutional Set-Up of the Czecho-
slovak State], 130 PRAVNfK, TEORETICK-e CASOPIS PRO OTAZKY STATU A PRAVA [THE
LAWYER'S SCIENTIFIC REVIEW FOR PROBLEMS OF STATE AND LAW] 503-04 (1991).
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II. POST-1989 CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. DISINTEGRATION OF THE ANTICOMMUNIST COALITION AFTER
THE REVOLUTION OF 1989
In late 1989, Czechoslovakia woke up again. Following the successful
attempts of people in other Eastern bloc countries to rid themselves of
the communist rule, Czechoslovakian citizens forced the resignation of
the communist leaders. This overthrow, or "revolution," started on No-
vember 17, 1989, when the police in Prague clamped down on a peace-
ful student demonstration commemorating the Nazi execution of a stu-
dent in 1938. It culminated on December 29, 1989 when Vdclav Havel
who led the coalition against the former regime, became President.
The revolution, which acquired the adjective "velvet" for its blood-
less character, however, did not offer any solution to the Czech-Slovak,
seemingly ethnic, dispute. During the revolution itself, the Slovaks
fought their common enemy, the communist establishment, hand in
hand with the Czechs. The broad anti-communist coalition in Czecho-
slovakia, had not required elaboration of any other concrete political
goals or development of a unified vision of the future democratic insti-
tutions.22 Following the overthrow of their common enemy, however,
the Czechs and the Slovaks, like the members of most practical coali-
tions, started to fight among themselves.28
27. Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitu-
tional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 595 (1991) (discussing
the institutional aspects of the Polish constitutional process).
The process of disintegration is also typical of conflicts other than the Czcch-Slovak
conflict. The political differentiation that occurred in the CSFR after the revolution
was a natural result of the diversity of the anti-communist coalition formed in the first
days of the 1989 revolution. For example, Civic Forum, the leading political force in
the Czech lands, initially led by President Havel, won a sweeping victory in the June
1990 parliamentary elections. Within 6 months, however, Civic Forum broke into two
large groups and one small grouping. Several months later a similar disintegration took
place in the Slovak equivalent of Civic Forum, Public Against Violence. Since then,
most of the large movements or parties, including the Communist Party and the Chris-
tian Democratic Movement, have gone through similar processes.
This process is also not unique to Czechoslovakia. Poland, for example, serves as a
text-book illustration of the fragmentation of a political coalition following a successful
overthrow of a totalitarian regime. The October 1991 elections brought over 25 parties
to the Polish parliament.
28. The first significant open conflict between the two "nations" was over the offi-
cial name of the country. In March 1990, the federal parliament adopted a new name -
Czechoslovak Federative Republic, dropping the word "socialist." A month later, in
April 1990, following a controversial debate that became known as the "hyphen war,"
the federal parliament adopted the name "Czech and Slovak Federative Republic."
Slovak deputies in the federal parliament demanded the use of a hyphen between the
words "Czech" and "Slovakia" in the shortened name of the country, Czechoslovakia,
hence the term "hyphen war."
1992]
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Like many coalitions against a common enemy, the members of the
anti-communist coalition in Czechoslovakia disregarded obvious ideo-
logical discrepancies and conflicting political agendas to achieve their
paramount goal of overthrowing the prior regime. Once the totalitarian
regime was defeated, and the broad national consensus that tran-
scended the revolution and the immediate "post-revolutionary" period
in Czechoslovakia eroded, it became evident that the two "nations" liv-
ing in the country were at very different and, arguably, incompatible
stages of development. 29 It transpired that the different histories of the
two "nations" dictated that they possess divergent aspirations for the
future. The Czechs, after conquering the communist totality, aspire to
become part of transnational institutions, which would necessarily re-
quire them to give up some of the prerogatives of a sovereign nation.
Some Slovaks, on the other hand, are still striving for their own sover-
eign state - either openly through achieving outright independence, or
more subtly through limiting their ties to the Czechs to those of a
confederation.3"
Another aspect that tends to be underestimated in characterizing the
current political dynamics in Czechoslovakia is the disparate religious
background of the Czech and Slovak societies. The Czechs, originally
Protestant and now largely secular with a small Catholic population,
cherish the democratic ideals of a civil society, liberalism, and individ-
ual rights. In contrast, one of the dominant factors in the Slovak soci-
ety is a traditional, socially conservative form of Catholicism.3 Also,
the political spectrum in each republic seems to be developing in a dif-
ferent direction on economic issues. People in the Czech lands have
enthusiastically embraced the ambitious and aggressive plan for
profound transformation of the centrally planned economy into a mar-
ket economy. In Slovakia, most of the politicians, apart from some
members of the current fragile government coalition, advocate a slow
transformation with a goal of establishing a "social-market econ-
29. Prihoda, supra note 6, at 1.
30. At the time of this writing, however, the Slovak governmental coalition still
supports coexistence with the Czechs in a federation.
31. This distinction between the republics is apparent in the efforts of the politi-
cians of the Christian Democratic Movement, members of the government coalition to
abolish the principle of separation of the church and state. Also, at the time of this
writing, a bill pending in the Slovak parliament would severely restrict the currently
valid liberal law on abortions. These efforts are not paralleled, at least not to such an
extent, in the Czech lands.
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omy."'32 This approach, due to the grim economic situation in
Slovakia,3 has broad support among the population.-"
It is beyond the scope and aspiration of this Article to identify and
analyze the entire spectrum of disparities and frictions between the
Czechs and the Slovaks. These few examples indicate that the gap be-
tween the two "nations" exists on several levels, including religious, po-
litical, economic, and ethnic. This gap, disguised behind the mask of
unity mandated and controlled by the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party throughout the last decades, seems to be further widen-
ing. It is foreseeable that the existence of a common state may not
bridge the growing gap between the Czechs and Slovaks."
Slovak concerns and yearnings, with their historical basis in the pe-
riod of domination by Hungary and the complex relationship with the
Czechs, and the unfulfilled expectations of autonomy and self-govern-
ance, periodically surfaced when the country was undergoing transi-
tions and crises.3 History repeats itself now, and the Slovaks are again
calling for more sovereignty. The call of the Slovaks for self-governance
is not surprising under the circumstances. In today's world, with pleas
32. For example, the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement which demands a
declaration of sovereignty and an adoption of a constitution of the Slovak Republic,
also "favours a social market economy." Klepac Party Favors Confederation. Social
Economy, FBIS-EEU-92-052, March 17, 1992, at 7 (citing Prague CSTK, March 16,
1992).
33. According to the Slovak Premier, "Slovakia's economy is in worse shape than
expected, with last year's gross domestic product having dropped by about 15 percent
and industrial production by 25 percent." Carnogursky Reviews Slovakia's 1991 Econ-
omy, FBIS-EEU-92-020, Jan. 30, 1992, at 7 (citing Prague CSTK, Jan. 28, 1992).
Also, unemployment rapidly increased to approximately 300,000 by the end of 1991.
This represents 11.8 percent of the total labor force. Id. See also Preliminary Slovak
Statistical Data for 1991, FBIS-EEU-92-025, Feb. 6, 1992, at 4 (citing Pravda, Feb.
1, 1992) (giving statistics demonstrating Slovakia's 1991 economic decline).
34. According to a survey conducted by the Group for Independent Social Analysis
(AISA) in November and December 1991, "[a]dditional data reveal an interesting at-
titude toward the market economy, which is supported by 52 percent of respondents in
the Czech Republic and 33 percent in the Slovak Republic, while 39 percent in the
Czech Republic and 53 percent in the Slovak Republic favor a mixed economy." Poll
Shows Several Groups Have Key Influence, FBIS-EEU-92-020, Jan. 30, 1992, at 8
(citing Rude Pravo, Jan. 25, 1992).
35. The relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks is different from, for ex-
ample, the conflict between the Serbs and Croatians at least in one significant aspect.
In the relatively recent past, during the Second World War, the Croatian fascists com-
mitted genocide on the Serbs, killing over half a million people. While many Slovaks
claim that the Czechs took advantage of them and benefitted from the Slovaks, no-
where in the history of the coexistence of these two nations can one find a chapter
similar to the Serb-Croatian scenario.
36. In 1918, the Slovaks felt unsatisfied with the unitary form of the First Repub-
lic. In 1938, they declared independence. Thirty years later, in 1968, while the Czechs
strived for more political freedoms, the Slovaks pressed for more "national"
sovereignty.
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arising for self-determination on almost all continents, it can hardly be
considered anachronistic. Such a call represents in essence, a political
struggle of a "nation" that is trying to define itself, including its own
political structures, vis-a-vis the rest of the world, rather than an ethni-
cally driven hatred directed against the Czechs.
The right to self-determination, however, need not necessarily lead to
secession. Indeed, only a small portion of Slovaks favors secession.
7
For others, the desired amount of self-governance is possible in a coun-
try shared with the Czechs. Their desire is more for a future institu-
tional structure to reflect the equality of the two "nations." Conse-
quently, it is important to distinguish in Slovakia the still rather limited
nationalistic groups and parties demanding secession, 8 and a much
broader-based appeal for a greater degree of self-governance.
Regardless of whether it is justified or not, this call is a real one. It
draws people by the thousands for meetings in the streets. The call
needs to be dealt with in a proper institutional manner. Unless the gov-
ernment adequately addresses it, the CSFR cannot emerge from its
present situation with the requisite constitutional stability necessary for
economic transformation and growth, protection of human rights and
the rights of minorities, and the nurturance of democratic values and
institutions.
B. ECONOMIC VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
In the first post-revolution elections on June 8 and 9, 1990, three
parliaments, the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National
Councils, were elected for two years, half the normal term, with a man-
date to adopt a new constitution. Apart from its practical legal implica-
tions, the new democratic constitution would fulfill a paramount sym-
bolic role: the old constitution, the pinnacle of the communist legal
system, would be replaced by a document embodying the visions and
aspirations of the people together with their concepts of a democratic
state, thus formally breaking away from their totalitarian past. Because
such a document cannot be drafted overnight, the federal parliament
37. See infra note 50, and accompanying text. See also Sunstein, supra note 6, at
644.
38. See infra note 120, and accompanying text (discussing the various Slovak na-
tionalistic groups and parties).
This call is, in effect, self-destructive when one considers the bad economic condi-
tions and forecasts for Slovakia, the relatively small population and territory, and a
possibility of international isolation resulting from secession. Also, an important factor
is the internal heterogeneity of Slovakia where the national minorities, notably Hun-
garians, may in turn also claim the right of self-determination, or even secession.
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decided to leave the 1960 Constitution operational until a new one is
adopted, and amend only the necessary parts.30
An important characteristic of Czechoslovakia in this transitional pe-
riod is the existence of two parallel but distinct attempts to restructure
the country. First, to solidify the newly created democratic institutions
and build the trust of the people in them. This undertaking, while diffi-
cult in its own right, is complicated by the second task: the necessity to
carry out simultaneous fundamental structural economic changes
designed to break away from the decade's long communist legacy of
centrally planned shortages and inefficiency.
The first concept that entails the constitutional process is plagued by
bitter disputes over the future framework of the country. The second,
the economic concept, unlike the constitutional one, has been compara-
tively successful given the state of the economy after the overthrow of
the communists. Since June 1990, the Federal Assembly managed to
pass many significant pieces of economic legislation, 40 as well as other
important acts such as the civil and penal substantive and procedural
codes.
The reasons for the different results in the constitutional and eco-
nomic legislation can likely be found in the initial continuance of the
national consensus after the June 1990 elections, and the first good will
efforts of the main political parties to find solutions to common
problems and the ability and willingness to compromise, before the
deep fragmentation of the political spectrum of the country took place.
This was, however, only possible due to the absence of the institutional
barriers to compromise.
Of course, any economic achievements realized to date may be short
lived; the success of any economic regime necessarily depends on a
solid constitutional underpinning and stability. Also, the economic
transformation that is taking place, requires for its success, a stable
and strong government that is able to make unpopular and difficult de-
cisions necessary for the reform.
39. See infra notes 55 - 64 and accompanying text (discussing the 1990 - 1991
Constitutional Amendments).
40. The Federal Assembly passed regulatory laws dealing with privatization, resti-
tution, foreign exchange, banking, joint ventures, foreign investment, and the commer-
cial and concession-based trades codes. The area that urgently needs and currently
lacks regulation, especially during the ongoing privatization process, is securities
regulation.
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C. FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
One of the main reasons for the failure of the constitutional process
in Czechoslovakia today lies in the institutional structure created by
the 1968 Federation amendment., 1 This document introduced a federal
structure with exceptional protections and safeguards for the Slovaks
who constitute, together with all the minorities living in Slovakia, one-
third of the population. These protections include the principle of par-
ity in one chamber of the federal parliament and in high executive po-
sitions, and super-majority voting requirements in certain instances.
Most importantly, however, the 1968 Federation amendment estab-
lished a concept referred to as the "prohibition of majoritarian rule"
(zdkaz majorizdcie), which now, after the 1990 first post-communist
free elections, has turned into the single most important institutional
roadblock preventing the lawmakers in Czechoslovakia from proceeding
with the constitutional reform.
1. Prohibition of Majoritarian Rule
Both the Czech and the Slovak republics have their own separate
legislative bodies, the National Councils, and both republics are repre-
sented on the federal level by the Federal Assembly. The Federal As-
sembly consists of two chambers: the Chamber of People, which con-
sists of deputies elected directly by the entire population on a
proportional basis; and the Chamber of Nations, which consists of sev-
enty-five deputies elected in the Czech republic and seventy-five depu-
ties elected in Slovakia. For each piece of important legislation,' 2 the
Czech and Slovak components in the Chamber of Nations vote sepa-
rately. A bill is approved only if adopted by a majority of not the pre-
sent, but the elected deputies representing each republic.4 3 Conse-
quently, thirty-eight votes in the Czech part, or thirty-eight votes in the
Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations can block any ordinary legisla-
tion. In addition, only thirty-one votes in either part are sufficient to
41. 1968 Federation amendment, supra note 25.
42. Id. at art. 42. The majoritarian rule (a majority outvoting a minority) is pro-
hibited, i.e. deputies in the two parts of the Chambers of Nations have to vote sepa-
rately, when voting on bills regulating taxes, price policy, customs, technological invest-
ment, labor, wages and social policy, press, media, economic administration,
establishment of federal organs of state administration, foreign economic relations, any
budgetary questions and issues of citizenship. Id. Interestingly, the prohibition of





block constitutional acts or amendments which need a three-fifths ma-
jority of the elected deputies for approval.
While the composition of the Chamber of Nations favoring the
smaller republic is not dissimilar to other federal states,' the conse-
quences of the voting procedure in the Chamber of Nations are quite
unique. These voting procedures result in a de facto creation of a three
chamber Federal Assembly consisting of the Chamber of People, and
the Czech and the Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations. Because
both chambers must approve each legislative act, the structure grants
an effective veto power to a small minority of Czech or Slovak deputies.
Obviously, this type of voting mechanism in a country with only two
constituent parts is bound to create impasses.
The situation in the Federal Assembly in the past year demonstrates
this proposition. The nationalistic Slovak opposition parties in the As-
sembly45 have regularly exercised the broad veto power in the Chamber
of Nations. While originally, after the elections, the Slovak parties ar-
guably functioned as a "constructive opposition," they shifted gears
and now paralyze the Parliament on any constitutional issue. This de-
structive role serves at least two important functions: (1) it magnifies
the inability of the government coalition parties to bring about a new
constitution; and (2) it maintains the institutional status quo until after
the elections.
2. Super-Majority Voting Requirements
Pursuant to the 1968 Federation amendment, all constitutional acts
and amendments, the declaration of war, and the election of the presi-
dent need to be approved by a three-fifths majority of all elected depu-
ties in all three parts of the Federal Assembly.' Considering the frag-
mented political spectrum in Czechoslovakia today,47 this requirement
44. The United States Senate, for example, has two senators from each state re-
gardless of its population. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
45. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the various Slovak na-
tionalistic groups).
46. 1968 Federation amendment, supra note 25, at art. 41.
47. Currently, the Federal Assembly consists of sixteen parties. Czechoslovakia's
political system traditionally consists of multiple political parties and coalition govern-
ments due to an election system based on proportional representation. Pre-Munich
Czechoslovakia demonstrated the variety and domination of political parties over
Czechoslovakian public life. EDWARD TABORSKI, CZECHOSLOVAK DzEtocRtAcy AT
WORK 94 (George, Allen & Unwin eds., 1945). See also Cutler & Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 513-14.
As in the First Republic, the recently passed amendment to election law No. 47/
1990 Zb. (on file with the American University Journal of International Law and Pol-
icy), is based on proportional representation. A natural result of the proportional elcc-
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makes it extremely difficult to reach political consensus on any of the
major issues.
3. Two-Member Federation
The "dual" nature of the Czechoslovakian federation intensifies the
complexity of the institutional structure set up by the 1968 Federation
amendment. Czechoslovakia consists of only two constituent republics;
the Czechs live in one, the Slovaks in the other. In this respect, Czech-
oslovakia differs from other "federal" systems, for example, India,
Spain, Switzerland, the United States, and Canada. 8 Belgium provides
the closest analogy to Czechoslovakia's ethnic division, with its domi-
nant Walloon and Flemish parts. Belgium, however, maintains a uni-
tary form of government, granting the ethnic groups a greater say only
in matters of language and culture. Belgium also has a bicameral par-
liament, but neither of the chambers de jure represents the regions or
ethnic groups; the deputies in both chambers are elected on a represen-
tative basis by the entire Belgian population."9
In contrast to Belgium, Czechoslovakia has a tension already built
into its institutional structure. As a result, two constituent units with
divergent aspirations and political cultures are unable to find a compro-
mise on fundamental issues of the future form of a common country.
The existence of only two partners in the federation causes each consti-
tutional issue to become over-politicized. Consequently, all issues are
typically solved only at a negotiating table rather than by a rational
search of optimal constitutional solutions. When discussion between the
republics reaches a deadlock, there is no swing vote, no third force to
break it.
It is in this respect that one needs to look at the history of the coun-
try in order to understand the current Czech-Slovak conflict. The bad
memories the Slovaks retained from the periods of Magyar (Hun-
toral system is a proliferation of smaller parties. This is even more true in post-commu-
nist Czechoslovakia where, like in Poland and Hungary, political life remains
unstabilized and parties struggle to define their identity, and their role and place in the
political spectrum of the country.
48. Canada, while consisting of ten provinces, resembles Czechoslovakia by the
clear polarization and resulting controversies between the English-speaking population
and the French-speaking population concentrated almost exclusively in the Quebec
province. India provides a similar situation where the division lies between the Hindu
and Muslim populations.
49. G. H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: BELGIUM
(Blaustein & Flanz, eds. 1974). It is true, however, that, despite the lack of any ex-
plicit constitutional provisions, Belgian parliamentary procedures are de facto based on
a consensus and compromise among the various ethnic groups and communities.
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garian) domination, the lack of sovereignty they perceive, their unful-
filled hopes for a federation in 1918, and the non-functional institu-
tional framework discussed above all combine to make difficult any
constructive constitutional discourse. It is important to keep in mind
that the unworkable 1968 amendment was drafted during the commu-
nist period when the constitution was only a meaningless piece of pa-
per, and when typically all parliamentary decisions were unanimous,
regardless of any voting structure or mechanism. At its inception, the
amendment was not contemplated to function without the authoritarian
communist rule, in a democratic pluralistic parliament. This ill-con-
ceived structure gives inordinate power to a small number of deputies
of the Assembly who, as a result, possess the ability to block any im-
portant legislation proposed by a majority.50
The constitutional process in the CSFR is further complicated by a
socio-cultural phenomenon where raised emotions characterize all dis-
cussions and negotiations between the Czechs and Slovaks. Both sides
juggle undefined and imprecise terms."1 Descriptions of the future
framework of the country range from a federation, true federation, au-
thentic federation, confederation, union, to a loose union. Recently,
commentators started using a peculiar term, a "unitary form of federa-
tion."52 Efforts to define the terms to facilitate the discourse are lack-
50. Currently, Slovak nationalists benefit from this mixed blessing despite public
opinion polls conducted in the CSFR in the last eighteen months that show that most
people in both republics wish to continue living in a common state. Nationwide Poll
Shows Support for Federation Vote, FBIS-EEU-91-222, Nov. 18, 1991, at 13 (citing
Prague CSTK, Nov. 15, 1991).
Indicative of the strong bargaining position of the Slovak opposition deputies in the
Chamber of Nations is, among other things, their resistance to increasing the federa-
tion members to include Moravia and Silesia. These two parts of the Czech republic
historically enjoyed a certain degree of self-governance thanks to a state structure, sim-
ilar to Germany's. Transferring the "dual" federation into one involving three, four, or
more members would shift the balance of power to Slovakia's disadvantage. Despite a
Moravian self-governance movement's recent proposals to offer Slovakia a special stat-
ute of autonomy in exchange for its support of the idea of a tripartite federation, the
Slovak political representation remains opposed to this concept. Moravian Deputy on
Tripartite Federation Proposal, FBIS-EEU-91-220, Nov. 14, 1991, at 12 (citing
Ndrodni Obroda, Nov. 12, 1991, at 3).
51. See Brodsk&, V Tatrbch bez obcansk5'ch priw [In Tatras without Human
Rights], Respekt, Nov. 11-17, 1991, at 8 (quoting the Hungarian Ambassador as say-
ing "[i]n the area of constitutional terminology, post-communist Czechoslovakia repre-
sents a 'semantic black hole' ").
52. See generally, Grexa, 0 jednote po jednote [On Unity After Unity], 3 Kultrny
Zivot 1 (1992) (criticizing the populistic call for a unity of the entire Slovak nation).
The semantic confusion, however, is not only a specific problem of Czechoslovakia. One
commentator cites research that revealed no less than 255 different understandings of
the term "federalism." See Gerloch, supra note 26, at 499, (citing M. Frenkel, Foeder-
alismus und Bundesstaat, Bd. I: Foederalismus, at 113) (Bern Frankfurt a.m., 1984).
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ing; the politicians even seem to thrive from the confusion and lack of
precision. 53 Most of the terms used to qualify "federation," however,
merely disguise the omnipresent political striving for greater autonomy
and sovereignty. 4 This seemingly innocuous semantic battle is, unfor-
tunately, a reflection of deeper, more fundamental dissimilarities be-
tween the two "nations."
D. 1990-1991 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Despite the inability of the Czechs and Slovaks to resolve their rela-
tionship, the two "nations" have already dealt with some issues in an
institutional manner. Soon after the parliamentary elections in January
1991, popular feelings induced the lawmakers to adopt a bill of
rights. 55 This was an understandable move, considering the communist
regime's numerous violations of civil and political rights, despite the
fact that the communist regime's 1948 and 1960 constitutions were
supposed to make the United States Bill of Rights "pale by
comparison.
'56
In December 1990, the Federal Assembly adopted a controversial
constitutional act on power-sharing between the federation and the re-
publics." In March 1991, it adopted a constitutional act on the consti-
53. A survey conducted by a Slovak Institute for Public Opinion Research in Feb-
ruary 1992 illustrates this problem. In the survey, 48% of the Slovak population ex-
pressed its wish to live in a federation "based upon the constitutions of two republics
with equal rights." Federation Most Favored State Form in Slovakia, FBIS-EEU-92-
044, March 5, 1992, at 12 (citing Prague CSTK, Feb. 27, 1992). Only eight percent,
however, accept the current model of federation, despite the strong safeguards that the
current model provides for the Slovak republic. Id.
54. There is only one party in Slovakia, the Slovak National Party, that openly
expresses hopes for Slovakia's independence. Other parties, like the Movement for
Democratic Slovakia, a splinter from the movement Public Against Violence, and the
Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, a splinter of the Christian Democratic Move-
ment, and some other smaller parties, hide behind "better sounding" and undefined
terms like "confederation."
55. UST.ZAK v.23/1991 Zb., uvdzajgci Listinu zdkladn'ch prdv a slobfd (CzEcH.
CONST. ACT No. 23/1991 Coll. of Laws, instituting the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms) [hereinafter the "Charter"].
56. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 647 n. 82 (noting that guaranteed rights mean
little where there are no institutions through which individuals can claim their rights).
In general, most of the communist constitutions in former Czechoslovakia and other
former communist countries provided for a full range of civil and political rights and
liberties on paper. In practice, however, the government violated each of these rights.
See id. (listing rights guaranteed by the former Soviet Constitution).
57. UST.ZAK. v.556/1990 Zb., ktor'm sa meni a dopina istavnf zbkon vc.143/1968
Zb., o 'eskoslovenskej federdcii (CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 556/1990 Coll. of Laws,
altering CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 143/1968 Coll. of Laws, on the Czechoslovak Feder-
ation) [hereinafter "1990 constitutional act on power-sharing"].
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tutional court58 and in July 1991, it adopted a constitutional act on the
judiciary.59 In addition, the Parliament enacted a constitutional act on
the holding of popular referenda in August 1991.6O
Despite these significant successes, the lawmakers concentrate too
heavily on the issues of federalism and the future institutional struc-
ture. By doing so, constitutional drafters risk losing sight of the long-
term interests and problems which a constitution should address.61
One example of an issue not sufficiently addressed due to the atten-
tion paid to the federalism debate arises in the Charter of January
1991. The Charter contains a provision establishing the supremacy of
international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms, such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified
and promulgated by Czechoslovakia over domestic legislation. Such
treaties directly apply to Czechoslovakian territory.62 A provision to
this effect is new and unique within Czechoslovakia's legal order.
Neither Czechoslovakian legal theory nor practice agree on the issue of
the hierarchy of norms of international law within the Czechoslovakian
domestic legal order. The existence of this unusual provision in section
2 of the Charter should signal lawmakers to pay sufficient attention to
an issue as significant as the applicability and status of international
law in the domestic legal order when they draft a new constitution.
Another example of an issue not sufficiently addressed is the treat-
ment of the many national minorities living in Czechoslovakia. The
Preambles to the 1948 and 1960 Constitutions, and the 1968 Federa-
58. OST.ZAK. v.91/1991 Zb., o dstavnom sfide Ceskej a Slovcnskej Federativnej
Republiky (CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 91/1991 Coll. of Laws, on the Constitutional
Court of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic).
59. UST.ZAK. c.326/1991 Zb., ktorym sa men a dopina ustava Ceskej a Slovenskej
Federativnej Republiky v zneni neskorsich predpisov (CZECH. CONsT. ACT No. 326/
1991 Coll. of Laws, altering the Constitution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Re-
public as amended).
60. UST.ZAK. v.327/1991 Zb. o celo tdtnom referende (CZECH. CoNsT. ACT No.
327/1991 Coll. of Laws, on Referendum) [hereinafter "Referendum Law"].
61. The parliament's preoccupation with the intricacies of the federalism debate is
the most obvious factor contributing to the lack of interest in important issues. There
is, however, another related factor. Any problem that fails to directly connect with the
main issue, federalism, still becomes a battle ground for the Czech-Slovak dispute. In
essence, the two rival nations compete on all fronts.
62. See UST.ZAK. v.23/1991 Zb., uvddzajtlci Listinu zdkladn5'ch prdv a slobad
[CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 23/1991 Coll. of Laws, instituting the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and Freedoms] at sec. 2 (stating that "[i]nternational treaties on human
rights and fundamental freedoms, ratified and promulgated by the Czech and Slovak
Federative Republic, are universally binding on its territory and supersede its own
laws"). The issue of whether international treaties supersede only ordinary legislation
or also constitutional acts, which require a super-majority for adoption, remains
unclear.
19921
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tion amendment spoke of the "equal" or "fraternal nations" of the
Czechs and Slovaks. 3 The constitution, however, does not mention
other nationalities such as Hungarians, Poles, Romanies, Ukrainians,
and Ruthenians who represent about twenty percent of the population
of Slovakia. In 1968, the Parliament enacted a separate constitutional
act dealing with minorities.64 It remains to be seen how this issue will
be dealt with in a future constitution. 5
E. PLAYERS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARENA
1. Federal Assembly
From a constitutional point of view, an unusual situation developed
in the CSFR. The federation still exists, but its supreme legislative
body, the Federal Assembly, lost most of its ability to influence the
constitution's development to the republics' bodies, the Czech and
Slovak National Councils and Czech and Slovak governments.60 The
main reason for this development is the above described paralyses of
the federal parliament in the constitutional arena. Many, including
President Havel himself, criticized the absence of federal bodies from
the constitution-making process. At the beginning of 1992, the Federal
Assembly made an attempt to enact three chapters of a federal consti-
tution newly arranging the relations between the president, the federal
parliament, and the federal government.67 This move was doomed from
63. Preamble of the 1960 Constitution, as amended in 1968 and 1991, states that:
"(1) The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is a federal state of two equal, frater-
nal nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks" and that "(2) The Czech and Slovak Federa-
tive Republic is founded on the voluntary bond of the equal, national states of the
Czech and the Slovak nations, based on the right of each of these nations to self-
determination." UST.ZAK. .100/1960 Zb., Czech. Const. of 1960 reprinted in GISBERT
H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(Blaustein & Flapz, eds. 1974).
64. UST.ZAK.CSFR c.144/1968 Zb., o postaveni ndirodnosti v Ceskoslovenskej
socialistickej republike (CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 144/1968 Coll. of Laws, Concerning
the Status of Ethnic Groups in the Czechoslovak Socialist republic).
65. One danger that the wording of the former constitutional preambles poses is
that pursuant to the Central European definition of a "nation," where "nation," means
"people," there is not much room for national minorities. See supra note 4 (explaining
the different definitions of the word "nation").
66. This article uses the term "government" to refer to the Prime Minister and the
Council or Cabinet of Ministers. This use, which does not connote the entire govern-
mental structure, is common in parliamentary systems.
67. One of the most important changes in the amendment was a different structure
of the federal parliament. The new parliament would consist of a Chamber of Repre-
s entatives, and a Senate located in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. DRAFT
UST.ZAK.CSFR No. 1212/1992 altering CZECH. CONST. ACT No. 143/1968 Coil. of




its inception due to the institutional structure of the Federal Assembly.
It follows that the amendment, while securing approval of the Chamber
of People, failed to get the approval of the Slovak opposition parties in
the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations."'
2. Czech and Slovak National Councils
The Federal Assembly, ineffective on constitutional matters, has
been effectively replaced by the republics' bodies. In the past twenty
months, the representatives of the National Councils and the republics'
governments met approximately twenty times to discuss the future of
the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. Interestingly, these discus-
sions were initiated by President Havel as consultations in search of an
optimal solution for the future set-up of the country that would be
based on a broad national consensus. The discussions, initially involving
representatives of federal institutions as well as political parties, gradu-
ally transformed into negotiations between the National Councils. The
main topics on their agendas included the creation of republic constitu-
tions and a new redistribution of the respective powers ("competen-
cies") between the federation and the republics.
Since the 1990 constitutional act on power-sharing, 8 both the
Czechs and the Slovaks expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo in
the division of powers, although for contradictory reasons. While many
in the Czech Republic consider the power of the federal government
and parliament inadequate, many Slovak politicians believe that too
many powers remain at the federal level. In November 1991, the
Slovak government adopted a conciliatory declaration" on the power-
68. Federal Assembly Rejects Constitution Amendments, FBIS-EEU-92-033, Feb.
19, 1992, at 3 (citing Prague CSTK, Feb. 18, 1992). Following a mandatory concilia-
tion procedure, which is triggered anytime a bill passes one chamber and not the other,
the amendment failed to pass the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations again on
March 3, 1992. Federal Assembly Fails To Amend Constitution, FBIS-EEU-92-044,
March 5, 1992, at 7 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Mar. 3, 1992). See also Assembly
Body Rejects Constitutional Amendment, FBIS-EEU-92-041, March 2. 1992, at 15
(citing Prague CSTK, Feb. 27, 1992).
69. UST.ZAK. c.556/1990 Zb., ktorym sa men[ a dopna OstavnS, zakon c. 143/
1968 Zb., o ceskoslovenskej federdcii [Constitutional Act No. 556/1990 Coil. of Laws,
altering Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. of Laws, on the Czechoslovak
Federation].
70. Slovak Government Adopts Stand on 'Power-Sharing' FBIS-EEU-91-226,
Nov. 22, 1991, at 8 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Nov. 19, 1991). This declaration be-
came known as the "12:8 Declaration," because eight ministers, including the Slovak
Prime Minister, refused to approve it. Carnogursky Reacts to Declaration, FBIS-EEU-
91-226, Nov. 22, 1991, at 9 (citing Narodna Obroda, Nov. 20, 1991, at 1, 6). The
Slovak Prime Minister stated that presenting the declaration at a government meeting
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sharing dispute and its economic and social consequences." The decla-
ration signified a more rational attitude by the Slovak executive to the
complex relationship with the Czechs. Many deputies of the Slovak
parliament, however, do not share the executive's viewpoint.
a. State Treaty
The discussion of the National Councils on the division of powers
became intertwined with negotiations over the so-called "state
treaty. '72 This controversial concept best reflects the different aspira-
tions and visions of the two republics.73 The history of the negotiations
over the treaty presents us with an interesting list of issues and con-
cepts over which the two "nations" differ. Although the treaty is not
going to be adopted, at least not before the elections, it is useful to
outline the events that led to this result as an illustration of the Czech-
Slovak conflict.
Theoretically, the state treaty was supposed to define the relationship
between the two republics in a future common state and work in con-
cert with a new constitution. 74 Initially, the Czech National Council
firmly opposed the state treaty concept. Later, the Council agreed to it
in principle, but controversies over the treaty remained. At first, there
was contention based on the division of powers. 75 Afterwards, no agree-
ment could be found on a more conceptual level. The Czech and Slovak
was politically dangerous. Id. Further, he asserted that the declaration is not legally
binding for the political parties of the Slovak National Council. Id.
71. The declaration stated that, in addition to the existing powers, a common state
should exercise legislative powers in the areas of labor, wages, and social policy. The
declaration also recommended that a common state should exercise executive power in
the areas of economic competition law, postal services, long-distance communication,
the rail networks, and a single currency. Id.
72. JAn Carnogursk , the present Slovak Prime Minister and the chairman of the
Christian Democratic Movement, introduced this concept in the spring of 1991. The
negotiations recently terminated after the Presidium of the Slovak National Council
failed to adopt an agreed text of the treaty. See infra notes 79 - 89 and accompanying
text (discussing the recently terminated negotiations on the state treaty).
73. See supra notes 5 - 22 and accompanying text (detailing Czech and Slovak
attempts to shape the country's constitutional framework).
74. The expression "state treaty," apart from the problems of definition, is hard to
translate into English. In Slovak, it is called "stdtna zmluva." "Zmluva" can be trans-
lated as treaty, contract or agreement. The treaty was supposed to form a basis for a
reformed federal institutional structure, including a new power-sharing arrangement
between the federation and the republics.
75. As of November 1991, "of the 88 provisions contained in the draft treaty, no
accord could be reached [between the National Councils] on 22 of them." Czech,
Slovak Differences on Treaty Viewed, FBIS-EEU-91-222, Nov. 18, 1991, at 9 (citing
Lidove Noviny, Nov. 14, 1991, at 1, 3).
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politicians differed on the way in which the treaty should be adopted
and its legal status and significance."8
In principle, the parties struggled with the question of whether to
build a federation from "below," in which the republics delegate power
to the federation, or from "above," in which the federation grants
power to the republics. The Slovak politicians advocated building from
"below." They argued this position by asserting that the treaty should
contractually oblige two independent republics to live in a common
state to which each of the republics would delegate certain powers. The
Czechs, on the other hand, supported the concept of building the feder-
ation from above and asserted that the legitimacy of the federation
should derive directly from the people rather than from the republics.
Further, nationalistic Slovak politicians claimed that each republic
should be a subject of international law, like all sovereign states. This
was unacceptable to the federal and Czech politicians who asserted
that as long as the federation existed it was the only body capable of
being a subject of international law. Otherwise, they argued, one could
not speak of a common state."
In addition, the Slovak version of the treaty called for a permanently
binding state treaty officially entitled, "Treaty between the Czech and
Slovak Republics." The treaty would include the Czech and Slovak re-
publics as the only parties, thus implicitly recognizing Slovakia as an
independent republic. 8 The Czech version called for a less formal in-
ternal agreement between the two National Councils.
After months of negotiations over the power-sharing aspect of the
treaty, the division of powers between the republics was more or less
settled. 9 At the beginning of February, the joint commission appointed
76. In Czechoslovakia, the Political Pendulum Swings From Compromise to Con-
frontation, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 27, 1992, at 7 (arguing that the privatization pro-
cess may expand the already existing economic gap between the republics, because
Slovakia is less-developed, poorer, and subsidized by the federal budget).
77. Id.
78. Havel, Carnogursky View Elections, State Treaty, FBIS-EEU-92-014, Jan. 22,
1992 at 11 (citing Bratislava Radio Network, Jan. 17, 1992). In a recent radio inter-
view, the Slovak Prime Minister elaborated on the differing approaches to the state
treaty stating:
We insist on the treaty being between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Re-
public. Although the republics would be represented by their respective
[N]ational [C]ouncils, it would be a treaty between the republics. In this sense it
would be a state treaty, because it would be a treaty between two states.
Id. at 12.
79. The chairman of the Slovak National Council, in an interview after a negotiat-
ing session in Milovy in February 1992, stated: "Indeed, Wednesday night we noted
something incredible - that on the question of division of powers we actually are not
very far apart." Reaction to Czech-Slovak Draft Constitution Treaty; Miklosko: 'Ac-
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
by both Councils agreed on the text of the treaty.80 The Czech Na-
tional Council reacted to the agreement by a resolution approving the
text.81 In the words of the chairwoman of the Czech National Council:
"[W]e have succeeded in really drawing up a draft treaty which truly
corresponds to the requirements of both participating parties. '82 Ten
deputies of the Slovak National Council's Presidium, however, did not
share the chairwoman's perception. The Presidium failed to approve
the treaty.8
The Slovak deputies had two principal objections to the text: (1) it
did not define who was a party to the treaty84 - it was not an official
treaty between two republics considered subjects of international law;85
and (2) it was not contemplated as a permanent source of law, rather
just a "legal initiative" to the Federal Assembly which could either
accept or disapprove the treaty.8 Having failed to adopt the treaty, the
two National Councils realized the futility of further negotiations, and
agreed to suspend talks until after the June elections.8
There are two important aspects of the state treaty negotiations to
note. The political debate over the issues of whether to build an institu-
tion from "below" or "above" has approximately the same degree of
precision and relevance as a debate over the difference between an "au-
thentic" and "true" federation. The negotiations were, in fact, only an-
other forum that highlighted the same differences between the two "na-
tions" that paralyze the Federal Assembly.
The real significance of the state treaty did not rest in its content or
form. Its value was largely symbolic. A successfully concluded treaty
ceptable Mechanism' Found, FBIS-EEU-92-031, Feb. 14, 1992, at 12 (citing Naroda
Obroda, Feb. 10, 1992).
80. Czech, Slovak National Councils Agree on Treaty, FBIS-EEU-92-027, Feb.
10, 1992, at 8 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Feb. 8, 1992); see also Text of Draft
Czech-Slovak Constitution Treaty, FBIS-EEU-92-031, Feb. 14, 1992, at 6 (citing
Hospodarske Noviny, Feb. 11, 1992) (reprinting the entire text of the document).
81. Czech Deputies 'Welcome' Next Meeting, FBIS-EEU-92-032, Feb. 18, 1992, at
12 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Feb. 13, 1992) (reprinting the entire text of the Czech
National Council resolution of February 13, 1992).
82. Czech, Slovak National Councils Agree on Treaty, supra note 80, at 8.
83. Slovak Council Fails To Pass Draft Treaty, FBIS-EEU-92-030, Feb. 13, 1992,
at 5 (citing Prague Radio, Feb. 12, 1992). 10 members of the Presidium voted to ap-
prove the treaty, and 10 voted against it. Id.
84. Klepac Spells Out Objections to Draft Treaty, FBIS-EEU-92-038, Feb. 26,
1992, at 10 (citing Slovensky Dennik, Feb. 15, 1992).
85. Id. The chairman of a nationalist oriented Slovak Christian Democratic Move-
ment said: "The Czech side tenaciously tries to prevent Slovakia from becoming more
visible as a separate entity." Id.
86. Id.
87. Czech, Slovak Leaders Suggest Talk Suspension, FBIS-EEU-92-049, March
12, 1992, at 10 (citing Prague CSTK, Mar. 11, 1992).
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would have been a preeminent symbol of national consensus, of the
ability of the two peoples to compromise and reach agreement on over-
arching principles. The Czech disappointment with the failure to adopt
a treaty, the concept they had originally opposed, best documents its
symbolic importance.8 The Slovak Prime Minister commented: "if a
treaty on the principles of a constitutional arrangement is not adopted,
the breakup of the common Czechoslovak state is possible." 89
b. Declaration of Sovereignty
The nationalistic parties have periodically brought another political
tool into the negotiations between the National Councils - a threat to
issue a "declaration of national sovereignty."190 The threat of the Slovak
National Council unilaterally presenting a declaration of sovereignty
persists."1 Such a declaration would, among other things, pronounce the
supremacy of the Slovak National Council's laws over those of the Fed-
eral Assembly. This would, arguably, constitute a violation of the cur-
rent federal constitution. No declaration has been issued yet, and some
say there is no danger of the declaration being issued before the elec-
tions. 2 What will happen afterwards, however, remains to be seen. One
reason for the hesitation over the declaration is that the Slovak Na-
tional Council has been waiting for a Slovak constitution to be adopted.
A draft of a constitution was presented in alternative forms in early
January for a public debate.9 3 No action on it has yet taken place. The
current options in the draft document cover a wide range of choices,
from a functional federation to an independent state." Depending upon
which alternative is adopted, the Slovak constitution itself, or certain
provisions therein, may violate the federal constitution.
88. Id. The chairwoman of the Czech National Council called the treaty "a good
document that could be a basis for transforming our state into an authentic federa-
tion." Id.
89. Carnogursky: State Breakup 'Possible'. FBIS-EEU-92-031, Feb. 14, 1992, at
13 (citing Prague Radio, Feb. 13, 1992).
90. See Slovak Republic's Draft of Sovereignty Declaration, FBIS-EEU-91-049,
March 13, 1991, at 17 (citing Smena, Mar. 2, 1991) (reprinting the full text of the
declaration). The parties even organized rallies in support of the declaration. See
'Thousands' of Slovaks Demand State Sovereignty, FBIS-EEU-91-048, March 12,
1991, at 10 (citing CTK, Mar. 12, 1991).
91. Miklosko on Consequences of Treaty's Rejection, FBIS-EEU-92-036, Feb. 24,
1992, at 13 (citing Naroda Obroda, Feb. 18, 1992) (interviewing the chairman of the
Slovak National Council on the effects of the rejection of the state treaty).
92. Id. The chairman of the Slovak National Council is of the opinion that "no
party will dare to take such a risky step before the elections." Id.
93. See Nbvrh Ustavy Slovenskej republiky [Draft of the Slovak Republic's Con-
stitution], Prdca, Jan. 8, 1992, at 4.
94. Id.
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F. CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCKS
The impasse, or some may say the constitutional crisis, that resulted
from the failure of the Federal Assembly to adopt three chapters of a
new constitution,95 and from the inconclusive treaty negotiations be-
tween the two National Councils, highlight another crucial deficiency
of the 1968 Federation amendment."6 It does not provide for any effec-
tive safety valves or deadlock-breaking mechanisms.
During the past twenty years, following the Soviet occupation in
1968, deadlock-breaking mechanisms were unnecessary. Consequently,
the magnitude of the Czech-Slovak conflict remained concealed due to
the omnipotent Communist Party which, with its blessings from Mos-
cow, effectively prevented people from getting involved in any highly
emotional controversies.9 7 Czechoslovakia's Communist Party no longer
has a dominant role in the society. Also, because the country does not
belong to any defense alliance, it is left in a security vacuum. Thus, the
struggle between the two "nations" remains an internal matter.
With only two partners in this "dual" federation, and the built-in
institutional tension, stalemates inevitably result. Therefore, the coun-
try would need a third force, either internal or external, to provide bal-
ance to the volatile political situation. President Havel recently tried to
supplement the missing role of a "third force" and, in an emotional
television address to the people,98 he proposed several draft bills
designed to combat the current impasses. 9
The politicians conducting the constitutional debate in Czechoslova-
kia have procrastinated for a relatively long time. One of the reasons is
the fall-back position that the parliaments created for themselves.
While the 1960 Constitution remains valid, amendments implemented
by Parliament may allow the political negotiations and "summitting"
to continue indefinitely. The amount of time the country has, however,
is impossible to estimate. In today's fast moving world, the economic
pressures may force Czechoslovakia to choose between speedily resolv-
ing the constitutional debate while simultaneously creating functioning
95. See supra notes 67 - 68 and accompanying text (detailing the reasons behind
the Federal Assembly's failure to adopt three chapters of the new constitution).
96. 1968 Federation amendment, supra note 25.
97. As one commentator put it: "[W]ith its hypocritical internationalism, the com-
munist regime covered up the existing conflicts, and made taboos of them. Problems
were not being solved, they were covered up." Kov6c, supra note 5, at 1.
98. Havel Appeals for Support to Resolve Crisis, FBIS-EEU-92-222, Nov. 18,
1991, at 7 (citing the Prague Federal I Television Network, Nov. 17, 1991) (translat-
ing and reprinting the text of Havel's "Address to the Nation").




democratic institutional structures in order to join European integra-
tions, or continuing to squabble and leaving Czechoslovakia out of the
integration processes.
G. PRESIDENT HAVEL'S LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Czechoslovakia is a parliamentary democracy, so the President is not
elected by the people and is not the head of the executive branch.
Czechoslovakian constitutions traditionally gave little power to the
presidents. President Havel's substantial influence in the country de-
rives from his personal appeal and charisma - as was the case with
President Masaryk - rather than from any particular constitutional
provisions. The current constitution and laws of Czechoslovakia give
the President some limited powers100 which implicitly include the rarely
exercised right of legislative initiative. The constitution, however, does
not provide the President with any effective legal means to break dead-
locks. The President cannot dissolve the Parliament (apart from the
one instance when the Federal Assembly cannot agree on a budget),
call for a referendum, or rule by decree.101 In an attempt to abate the
constitutional crisis and improve the ill-conceived institutional structure
of the 1968 Federation amendment,1 12 the President proposed several
new laws to the federal Parliament.
10 3
The President's first proposal called for a ratification of the new fed-
eral constitution by the Czech and Slovak National Councils, after its
100. 1968 Federation Amendment art. 61, supra note 25. The presidential powers
pursuant to the amendment are limited. The President may appoint and recall the
Prime Minister and other ministers, grant amnesty, dissolve the Federal Assembly if it
cannot agree on a budget, conduct foreign affairs, serve as Commander-in-Chief of the
army, and call for new elections. Id.
101. Concerned with the situation in the country, President Havel opened his No-
vember 17 speech with the following words:
Everything seems to indicate that, at present, our representative bodies are una-
ble to reach a timely and reasonable agreement about future coexistence in our
state.... [T]he talks have begun to go in circles and have gradually become the
object of opposition and even mockery by our citizens and the mass media.
Havel Appeals for Support To Resolve Crisis, supra note 98, at 7.
102. Havel's New Year Speech Views Progress, Goals. FBIS-EEU-92-001, Jan. 2,
1992, at 14 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Jan. 1, 1992) (explaining the reasons for his
proposals). In his New Year's speech Havel stated:
[N]ot long ago, I submitted to the Federal Assembly several draft laws that
could open the road to further negotiations, create a system of safeguards against
a possible crisis, and at least make sure that there would be an election in June.
Id.
103. Havel Addresses Federal Assembly 3 Dec [hereinafter "Havel's Proposals"],
FBIS-EEU-91-233, Dec. 4, 1991, at 10 (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Dec. 3. 1991)
(presenting his proposals in a speech to the Federal Assembly).
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adoption by the Federal Assembly. 04 On January 21, 1992, even
though President Havel's proposal met the demands of the radical
Slovak politicians, the Slovak opposition parties in the Federal Assem-
bly exercised their veto power and blocked its adoption for
ratification.'
Next, the President proposed an amendment to the Referendum Law
which would allow him to initiate a referendum in the entire country or
in only one of the republics with the consent of the federal government.
The President would not have to secure the consent of the Federal As-
sembly.' 06 This proposal also obligated the President to call for a refer-
endum if 500,000 people in the Czech republic, or 250,000 people in
the Slovak republic sought one.'0  Presently, 2.5 million signatures call-
ing for a referendum have been collected in Czechoslovakia, 0 8 but to
no avail. Current law' 019 requires the initiation of a referendum no later
than five months before the end of the election terms of the Federal
Assembly and the National Councils. With the next election scheduled
for June, hopes for a referendum are futile. 110 The Federal Assembly
voted down the proposed bill on January 21, 1992."'
104. Id. In justifying the proposal, Havel noted that it corresponded to the CSFR's
unusual situation. Id. The requirement of ratification originated with the Slovak repre-
sentation and was opposed by the Czech and federal politicians. Ratification of the
federal constitution by the National Councils was accepted as a political trade-off in
order to reach a consensus with the Slovak representatives on the constitutional frame-
work. Id.
105. Legislators Reject Two Havel Draft Bills, FBIS-EEU-92-014, Jan. 22, 1992,
at 11 (citing Prague CSTK, Jan. 21, 1992) [hereinafter "Legislators Reject Two
Havel Draft Bills"].
106. Havel's Proposals, supra note 103, at 13.
107. Id.
108. Id. According to the latest polls, 74% of the people in Czechoslovakia (78%
in the Czech Republic, and 66% in Slovakia) believe that the question of a future
existence of a common state should be decided by a referendum. See Nationwide Poll
Shows Support for Federation Vote, supra note 50, at 13. See also Legislators Reject
Two Havel Draft Bills, supra note 105, at 11 (noting requirements giving the president
the right to call a referendum).
109. UST.ZK. o referende c. 327/1991 Zb., (Constitutional Act No. 327/1991
Coll. of Laws, on Referendum).
110. Even if a referendum was possible, however, it is not certain it would help the
situation. The effectiveness of a referendum would depend on the question that would
be presented to the people. The reason is that most of the population of Czechoslovakia
wants to preserve a common state. The issue that no consensus has been reached on so
far is a form that this common state should have. As one commentator put it: "[T]his
[issue] really cannot be solved by referendum. Such an attempt would shed light on the
matter only if [a referendum] resulted in a decision to break-up the common state."
Pvrihoda, supra note 6, at 1-2. If the result of a referendum was a positive one, the
protagonists of Slovak sovereignty might be silenced for a while, but the issue of the
Czech-Slovak relationship would not be resolved. Id.
11l. Legislators Reject Two Havel Draft Bills, supra note 105, at 11. Typically, it
is the ethnic minorities and administrative entities that exploit referenda in their efforts
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Another of the President's proposals would give him the ability to
dissolve the parliament when the two chambers are unable to agree on
a draft bill. It would further enable him to rule by presidential decree
after dissolving the Parliament and before a new one would be
elected.112 This bill was rejected by both chambers of the Federal As-
sembly on January 28, 1992.111
Yet another of the President's proposals concerned a new Federal
Assembly structure. 14 First, the proposal would transform the Assem-
bly into a unicameral body consisting of 200 deputies. Second, the pro-
posal would create a new entity, consisting of thirty members, called
the Federal Council.11 5 After the Federal Assembly failed to pass the
President's drafts on the ratification procedure and the amendment to
the Referendum Law, he withdrew his Federal Council proposal.'
The President's final proposal concerned a new election law based on
a mixture of the majoritarian and proportional election systems." 7 A
group of eleven deputies of the Federal Assembly (from eight different
political parties) proposed an alternative to Havel's proposal - an
amendment to the current election law based on proportional represen-
tation.118 The Federal Assembly declined the President's proposal and
adopted the one presented by the deputies. 119 One reason for the re-
fusal was that the Slovak opposition parties simply seem to resist any
proposals from the President. But there was also a much more prag-
to gain independence, declare sovereignty, or achieve autonomy within larger units.
Interestingly, in the CSFR, the pro-federation parties in both the Czech and Slovak
republics pushed for a referendum while the nationalistic parties in Slovakia fiercely
opposed such a measure.
112. Havel's Proposals, supra note 103, at 12.
113. Parliament rejects Havel Presidential Powers Bill, FBIS-EEU-92-019, Jan.
29, 1992, at 7 (citing Czechoslovak Radio Prague, Jan. 28, 1992).
114. Havel's Proposals, supra note 103, at 13.
115. The delegated representatives of the republics' National Councils would com-
prise the thirty members. The proposal would also give the Federal Council a suspen-
sive veto over legislation. Id. It is doubtful whether such a structure would, if adopted,
solve any potential deadlocks, because the proposal would still require the unicameral
Federal Assembly to cast separate votes on many issues in the Czech and Slovak
sections.
116. Havel Withdraws Proposal for Federal Assembly and Council New Proposal
Tabled, BBC-EE-1287-B-I, Jan. 25, 1992, at I (citing Czechoslovak Radio, Jan. 22,
1992).
117. Havel's Proposals, supra note 103, at 14; Havel Briefs Journalists on Draft
Election Law, FBIS-EEU-91-247, Dec. 24, 1991, at 6 (citing Czechoslovak Radio,
Dec. 23, 1991).
118. Prezident Kontra Parlament, Dva Nvrhy Volebnho Zhkona [President Con-
tra Parliament. Two Proposals of Election Law], Respekt, Dec. 16-22, 1991, at 4 (dis-
cussing optional proposals).
119. Parliament Passes Amended Electoral Law, FBIS-EEU-92-020, Jan. 30,
1992, at 7 (citing Prague CSTK, Jan. 29, 1992).
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
matic reason for the preservation of the proportional election system-
self-interest. The deputies in the fragmented Parliament resisted a
change in the election system that would endanger their prospects for
reelection in June. The mixed election system would prevent a great
number of small parties from getting seats in the Parliament.
The fate of the President's proposals in the Federal Assembly came
as no surprise. The surprising part was the President's submission of
the draft bills. While all the proposals, if adopted, would mean a valua-
ble improvement to the constitutional framework of Czechoslovakia,
they were destined to fail from the very outset. The veto power of
thirty-one deputies in the Chamber of Nations, and the track record of
the "Slovak bloc"'120 in this chamber of successfully blocking any at-
tempts to change the institutional order of the federal Parliament is
well known. Therefore, it is not only surprising, but indeed troubling, to
see the President launch a constitutional initiative that, albeit well
meant, cannot succeed under the circumstances. President Havel is one
of the very few integrating factors left in Czechoslovakia today. This
unfortunate move only diminishes his prestige. If President Havel, a
man of great vision and personal appeal, fails to make the politicians
agree, it is doubtful whether anything will.
H. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE
Czechoslovakia's future remains uncertain. At the time of this writ-
ing, one can only guess the results of the upcoming June elections and
the developments they will bring. Indeed, the elections themselves may
be problematic.
After the negotiations between the National Councils ended in fail-
ure, the political representatives decided not to make any further at-
tempts to negotiate, and instead have concentrated their hopes on the
elections. 2' The elections might further destabilize the already volatile
political scene, if their results create as fragmented a political spectrum
120. See Maridn Timorack', Otbzka otbzky [Question of a Question!, Respekt,
Nov. 25 - Dec. 1, 1991, at 4 (discussing referendum and political parties in the CSFR).
The most nationalistic parties in the Federal Assembly are the Slovak National Party,
the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic Left (formerly
the Communist Party), and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (a recent
splinter of the Christian Democratic Movement). These parties vote together as the
"Slovak bloc."
121. The chairman of the Slovak National Council summarized the situation as
follows: "We have agreed with the representatives of the Czech political scene and with
the head of state that the situation should remain unchanged until the elections and
that no risky experiments should be undertaken." Miklosko on Consequences of
Treaty's Rejection, supra note 91, at 13.
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as exists today. Because the institutional structure of the newly elected
federal Parliament will be identical to the current one,1 22 it might even
prove impossible to elect any president by the necessary three-fifths
majority, and to form a federal cabinet.
Neither the 1968 Federation amendment, nor any other applicable
law, dictates what happens if the Federal Assembly fails to elect a
President.123 The only applicable provision of the 1968 Federation
amendment is article 64, which gives presidential powers to the federal
Prime Minister if the President, for various reasons, is not capable of
executing his duties. There is no provision, however, on how to ulti-
mately bring about a successful election, nor is there any provision on
who executes presidential functions if the Federal Assembly is unable
to form a federal cabinet.
Some politicians, including President Havel himself, have recognized
this danger. Voicing his concern, the President stated: "I am afraid
that Jesus Christ combined with Winston Churchill would not be
elected president in such an election .... It is possible to envisage that
we will have neither a president nor a new government and, moreover,
a non-functioning parliament.""12 Aware of the small probability of
electing a president with the currently valid provisions of the 1968 Fed-
eration amendment, the three parts of the Federal Assembly were, sur-
prisingly, able to agree on a constitutional amendment that made the
prospects of electing a president after the June parliamentary elections
a little more plausible. The new amendment provides for a presidential
election in two rounds. If a candidate is unable to obtain a three-fifths
majority in all three parts of the Federal Assembly in the first round,
an absolute (fifty percent) majority will suffice in the second round. 2
Despite the many 'unknowns,' several likely scenarios for the future
are summarized below. If the President is not elected and the federal
122. The Federal Assembly failed to adopt the three chapters of the constitution
which would have changed the current set up. See supra notes 67 - 68 and accompany-
ing text. See also Havel 'Afraid' of Presidential Election Problems, FBIS-EEU-92-
000, March 13, 1992, at 6 (citing Mlada Fronta Dnes, March 10, 1992).
123. The 1968 Federation amendment, supra note 25, in art. 62 states: "The elec-
tion of the President ... shall be held within the last fourteen days of the Presidential
term of office." Id. It may be inferred, that the incumbent President ceases to hold the
office within fourteen days, regardless of whether a new President is elected.
124. See Havel 'Afraid' of Presidential Election Problems, supra note 122, at 6.
The article cites the First Deputy of the Federal Assembly who, contrary to Havel,
believes that "according to the currently valid constitution, the non-election of a head
of state would not have to provoke a constitutional crisis." Id.
125. Amendment to Presidential Election Law Passed, FBIS-EEU-92-075, April
15, 1992 (citing Prague CSTK, April 15, 1992). If the second round fails, the incum-
bent president remains in office, but only up to a maximum of three months. Id. Conse-
quently, parliament may not be able to agree on a president.
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government is not formed, the country may continue disintegrating to
the point of a complete breakup.1 26 Alternatively, Czechoslovakia may
be trapped in a continual constitutional crisis and long-term instability
reminiscent of post-war Italy. 2  This may occur even if the Federal
Assembly ultimately does agree on the remainder of a new constitution,
and creates a highly decentralized federal structure with minimal pow-
ers on the federal level, or a confederation. Furthermore, such a frame-
work would cause the economic processes in the two republics to de-
velop in different directions.
While the post-1989 constitutional developments do not allow for ex-
cessive optimism, there are some grounds for a more optimistic outlook
to defy this cynicism.
Public opinion polls have consistently shown that a majority of the
population in both republics wishes to remain in a common state.128 For
these people, the strive for self-governance and self-determination does
not necessarily result in separatist tendencies or secession. If their wish
is unequivocally demonstrated, for example, in a referendum, that ex-
pression of unity may contribute a great deal towards constitutional
stability. A considerable portion of the Czech-Slovak conflict is, in es-
sence, a power struggle. There is some hope that if the most nationalis-
tic politicians assume posts in the federal structures, they might gradu-
ate into "good citizens" of the common state.
Despite all of the above, one hopes that the economic realities, to-
gether with the international developments, including the European in-
tegration processes, will induce the Czechoslovakian lawmakers to
move beyond the frictions and collisions, and to design a functioning
common modus operandi.129 If not, one must at least trust that the
country will "muddle through" these difficult times in the hope that the
two rival "nations" might come to terms with each other sometime in
the near future.
126. This constitutes a "worst case scenario." No reasonable person wishes such a
result. Even if the country splits, however, it is doubtful a Yugoslavian-like civil war
would result. The internal as well as international consequences of such a split are hard
to imagine. An issue, not yet sufficiently addressed, is the question of succession. That
would, however, merit a separate article.
127. If such development was to follow, it could be terminated by the Czechs who
might determine that it was not worth it remaining in the union.
128. See supra note 50 (discussing public opinion polls conducting in the CSFR).
129. One commentator suggested that the European Community, the Council of
Europe, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe may, in fact, "ex-
ercise a salutary constraining influence" on the number of choices that the Eastern
European countries have to face in their constitution-making processes. Elster, supra




Czechoslovakia is an example of how institutions are able to frus-
trate people's hopes. Two years ago, amidst the post-revolution and
post-free election euphoria, few contemplated that the mandate to re-
place the old constitution with a new one before the June 1992 parlia-
mentary elections would prove insurmountable. Now, without a new
constitution, the country is waiting for the elections with mixed emo-
tions: hope as well as fear of the fate of the common state and the
speed and shape of the economic reform.
Two years ago, neither the population at large, nor the politicians on
either side appreciated the significance of the factors that divide the
society. Two of the important factors dealt with in this Article, the
divergent aspirations of the two "nations" and the ill-conceived institu-
tional structure, have combined to cause an unhappy result. If only the
aspirations differed, a positive institutional framework could have con-
tributed towards eliminating them. Conversely, if only the structure
was a problem, and a broad national consensus would have continued,
it could have caused the structure to change. To combat both of these
factors simultaneously has proved impossible so far.
The Slovak call for self-determination and self-governance cannot be
underestimated. Some argue it is a justified call, but regardless of any
attempt to justify it by objective criteria, the significance of the call is
its imminence and reality. The call has to be dealt within an appropri-
ate institutional fashion, otherwise it will remain as a constant threat, a
sword of Damocles hanging over the Czech-Slovak relationship and co-
existence. When addressing it, one must, however, distinguish between
a broad-based self-determination call, and populist secession demands
reflecting the power struggle and ambitions of individual politicians.
Perhaps the best distinguishing criterion between these two is how
democratic are the means utilized by the policitians to achieve their
goals.
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